社会目标、雇员规模与民营化定价  

Social Goals,Labor Change and Privatization Pricing

作　　者：李广子[1] 刘力[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院金融研究所,北京100732 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《金融研究》2013年第1期177-191,共15页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71202133);国家社科基金项目(06BJY114)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：利用中国上市公司民营化样本,本文从控制权转让价格与民营化后公司雇员规模变化关系的角度考察了民营化中的定价问题。本文发现,民营化价格越高,民营化后上市公司雇员规模下降幅度越大,反之则越小;并且,这种关系对于低素质雇员规模来说尤其明显,对于高素质雇员规模不明显。本文将其归结为原国有控股股东追求社会目标的结果,即原国有控股股东通过低价出售控制权,以换取新民营控股股东在上市公司民营化后增加雇员或减少裁员。本文的研究为深入理解我国民营化改革的定价过程提供了新的视角。Using a sample of listed firm＇s privatizations in China, this paper investigates the relation between privatization pricing and the labor change after privatization. We find that the transfer price of control right is negatively related with the labor change after privatization. Further evidence shows that this relation is much stronger for low quality labor than for high quality labor. This relation contradicts the pricing principle in market economy. Our explanation for this is that, to achieve its social goals, the former state controlling shareholder re- duces the transfer price as an exchange for a bigger increase or a smaller decrease in labor after privatization. Our study offers new evidence for us to understand the pricing process of privatization in China.

关 键 词：社会目标 雇员规模 民营化定价 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224