关系型治理何时能够抑制渠道投机行为?——企业间关系质量调节作用的实证检验  

When does Relational Governance Inhibit Opportunism in Marketing Channels? The Moderating Effect of Interorganizational Relationship Quality

作　　者：周茵[1,2] 庄贵军[1,2] 彭茜[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,西安710049 [3]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《管理评论》2013年第1期90-100,共11页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70372051)

摘　　要：以营销渠道行为与组织理论为基础,实证探讨了企业间关系质量对制造商使用关系型治理与经销商投机行为之间关系的调节影响。通过对来自制造业的152份数据分析发现:在低企业间关系质量下,制造商采用共同制订计划的方式进行关系型治理会抑制经销商的投机行为,采用共同解决问题的方式则会增多经销商的投机行为;在高企业间关系质量下,制造商采用共同制订计划的方式进行关系型治理会增多经销商的投机行为,而采用共同解决问题的方式则会抑制经销商的投机行为。本文的研究结论对于制造商合理选择关系型治理方式制定决策,抑制经销商的投机行为具有重要的理论与实践意义。Based on the theory of marketing channel behavior and organizational research, this paper tests the moderating effect of in- terorganizational relationship quality on the relationship between relational governance and channel opportunism. Results from a survey of 152 respondents show that when the level of interorganizational relationship quality is low, manufacturers＇ use of joint planning will inhibit distributors＇ opportunism while the use of joint problem solving will exacerbate distributors＇ opportunism; when the level of in- terorganizational relationship quality is high, manufacturers＇ use of joint planning will exacerbate distributors＇ opportunism while the use of joint problem solving will inhibit distributors＇ opportunism. The findings have critical theoretical and managerial implications for manufacturers employing relational governance to manage channel opportunism.

关 键 词：关系型治理 共同制订计划 共同解决问题 投机行为 企业间关系质量 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]