考虑信息粘性的服务合作生产控制权分配  

Service Co-production Residual Right Allocation Considering Information Stickiness

作　　者：李慧芬[1] 杨德礼[1] 王建军[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第6期205-210,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重大项目(70890080;70890083);国家自然科学基金资助青年项目(70902033);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271039)

摘　　要：知识密集型服务是客户与供应商合作生产的系统,参与方信息粘性的大小影响合作剩余控制权分配。模型综合考虑参与方相对重要性参数和信息粘性大小对服务合作生产控制权结构的影响。结论表明,信息粘性的存在导致了服务合作生产效率的损失,是合作契约不完全性的一个来源;在双方信息粘性相同的情况下,相对更重要的一方拥有剩余控制权是最优的;在双方信息粘性不同时,让信息粘性大且相对更重要的一方拥有剩余激励是最优的;如果信息粘性优势和相对重要性优势并没有集中于一方,则结果取决于两者的比较,具有更强优势的一方应成为剩余激励的索取者。双方的相对重要性参数和信息粘性大小共同决定合作剩余控制权的分配。Knowledge-intensive services are co-production systems across client and provider organizations, and their information stickiness would result in an impact on the allocation of the residual right. We identify and mod- el the impact of the relative importance parameters and the information stickiness on the ownership of the residual right. We show that, information stickiness is linked to the loss of efficiency and contributes to contract incom- pleteness; with equal information stickiness expenditures, the more important party should own the residual right ; when their information stickiness costs are not the same, the party who has both information stickiness ad- vantage and the relative importance advantage should be the owner of the residual incentive ; if the two compara- tive advantages do not belong to the one, the choice of ownership structure would be contingent on the trade-offs between the advantages and the residual right should be given to the winner. Relative importance parameters and information stickiness jointly determine the allocation of co-production residual right.

关 键 词：博弈论 信息粘性 Nash讨价还价机制 服务合作生产 控制权 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]