自私性机会网络中激励感知的内容分发的研究  

Research of incentive-aware data dissemination in selfish opportunistic networks

作　　者：赵广松[1] 陈鸣[1] 

机构地区：[1]解放军理工大学指挥自动化学院,江苏南京210007

出　　处：《通信学报》2013年第2期73-84,共12页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家重点基础研究发展计划("973"计划)基金资助项目(2012CB315806);国家自然科学基金资助项目(61070173;61103225)~~

摘　　要：提出了一种网络服务商A类节点与B类节点可以达到共赢的互惠激励机制RIS;分析了在该激励机制下,各个理性节点如何选择存储内容从而最大化自己的收益,并探讨了节点维护网络拓扑信息的范围与节点选择决策的关系。最后使用MIT trace数据集仿真分析了在每个节点试图最大化自己收益时整个机会网络的内容分发性能。仿真结果表明,在部署了所设计的共赢激励机制后,与无激励机制相比,每个频道的平均接收率提高了18%,平均接收时延减少了4.83天,同时B类节点为每个订阅内容的付费也得到降低。随着节点维护的网络拓扑信息范围的扩大,该激励机制能不断提高网络的分发性能。A reciprocal incentive scheme named RIS was proposed, which could create win-win situation for the internet service provider, A type nodes and B type nodes. When RIS was deployed in a selfish opportunistic network, how these selfish nodes select data objects for their limited buffer to maximize their revenue was analyzed. Furthermore, the effect of the scope of network information the nodes maintain on the selection of stored data objects for their buffer was re- vealed. Extensive trace-driven simulations using MIT trace were carried out to evaluate the data dissemination perform- ance when all nodes were trying to maximize their revenue during the process of data dissemination. The results demon- strate that after deploying this incentive scheme, the average receiving rate of each channel rises by 18%, and the average receiving delay of each channel was reduced 4.83 days. Moreover, B type nodes only need to pay less for each subscribed data object. The simulation results also show that the larger scope of network information the nodes maintain, the better performance RIS can achieve.

关 键 词：机会网络 自私性 激励机制 频道 

分 类 号：TP393.1[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]