制造商规模不经济的链与链竞争两部定价合同  

Two-part tariffs of chain-to-chain competition under manufacturer's scale diseconomies

作　　者：赵海霞[1] 艾兴政[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2013年第2期60-70,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070)

摘　　要：基于链与链数量竞争及制造商生产规模不经济的环境,以批发价格合同为基准,探索两部定价合同选择的绩效改进条件、博弈均衡特征和局限性,并进一步分析市场竞争强度、规模不经济参数对合同选择行为的影响.研究发现:不管竞争对手供应链是否采用两部定价合同,本供应链通过采用两部定价合同并把固定收费调节在适当范围内,可使制造商和零售商同时实现帕累托(Pareto)绩效改进.值得指出的是,通过适当调节固定收费,两部定价合同成为实现制造商和零售商帕累托绩效改进的占优均衡合同,但该固定收费的选择严重依赖于竞争强度和规模不经济的程度.当规模不经济程度相对较强且严重依赖于数量竞争强度时,两部定价合同是实现供应链系统绩效改进的占优均衡合同.Based on chain-to-chain quantity competition and the manufacturers＇ scale diseconomies, this pa- per not only explored the requirements of the performance improvement of supply chain＇ s members, the char- acters of the equilibrium, and the limitations of the two-part tariffs when the manufacturer chooses the two-part tariffs other than wholesale price contract, but also analyzed the impact of intensity of quantity competition and scale diseconomies on the behaviors of manufacturer＇ s choices. The results show that： two-part tariffs can re- alize the win-win of both the manufacturer＇ s and retailer＇ s performances by adjusting the fixed fee regardless of the rival supply chain＇ s contract choice; the equilibrium can be a dominant equilibrium by adjusting the fixed fee, but the fixed fee is strongly influenced by the intensity of scale diseconomies and quantity competi- tion ; two-part tariffs produces a dominant equilibrium for the supply chain＇ s performance when the intensity of scale diseconomies is relatively stronger and influenced by the intensity of quantity competition.

关 键 词：链与链 数量竞争 规模不经济 两部定价合同 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]