Stackelberg博弈下双链价格竞争的纵向结构选择  

Double chains of price competition vertical structure choose under Stackelberg game

作　　者：滕春贤[1] 童清天[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《科技与管理》2013年第1期30-33,共4页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71171069);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(G201222);哈尔滨理工大学研究生创新科研项目(HLGYCX2011-009)

摘　　要：构建线性需求函数下两层供应链价格竞争模型。分析在Stackelberg博弈下3种情景中供应链竞争的均衡解:集中式情景、混合式情景、分布式情景。通过分析发现当竞争水平强度低时,集中式情景是供应链结构选择的Nash均衡;当竞争水平强度高时,分布式情景是供应链结构选择的Nash均衡,并指出在Nash均衡情况下囚徒困境的现象。The paper constructs two layer supply chain price competition model with a linear demand function. Under the Stackelberg game we analyze the supply chain competition results in three scenarios：centralized scenario, hybrid scenario,decentralized scenario. The paper shows that when competition level is low,centralized scenario is Nash equilibrium of supply chain structure choice;When competition level is high,decentralized scenario is Nash equilibrium. There exists prisoners＇ dilemma phenomenon.

关 键 词：供应链竞争 STACKELBERG博弈 NASH均衡 囚徒困境 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]