基于电力供应链收益的可再生能源政策比较  

Comparison of Renewable Energy Policy Based on Electricity Supply Chain Benefit

作　　者：吴文建[1] 任玉珑[1] 史乐峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2013年第3期44-48,共5页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目"电动汽车引致的能源安全问题研究"(编号:CDJXS11020006);国家电网管理咨询项目"新能源革命与城乡统筹下的电网功能定位研究"(编号:2020809920110088)

摘　　要：可再生能源电力政策直接影响各相关主体的收益,造成不同的主体选择行为。已有研究较少考虑可再生能源政策对电力供应链相关主体收益及其分配的影响。将可再生能源政策按照价格和数量的管制程度划分为四种,借助博弈理论和两级供应链理论,分析各方利益主体在不同政策下的收益分配函数,并对推导结果进行对比、延伸。研究后发现:政府对可再生能源电力价格或数量的政府管制政策,有利于提高供应链双方收益,但无法保障收益能够被合理地分配,这主要取决于制定的电价或数量能否量化可再生能源电力的额外成本;而配额制通过控制配额保证可再生能源发展目标的实现,借助市场机制调节供应链双方收益分配,是可再生能源政策的改革方向。Renewable electricity policy directly influences the benefit of relevant parts, which leads to the different behavior choices. Research on renewable energy policy has less consideration on benefit distribution among the power supply chain parts. The renewable energy policy is divided into four kinds by the intervention on price and quantity. Based on the stack berg game theory and two supply chain theory, the paper analyzes the benefit distribution function between grids and power generation companies with the different intervention policies, and deduces the results. It is found that the policy about controlling over the price or the quantities would contribute to the benefit improvement, rather than the rational benefit distribution, compared to market automatic adjustment. In addition, the quota should be the main direction for renewable energy policies, which could ensure the widespread use of the renewable electricity by controlling the quota quantities, and could better protect both parts benefit through the internalized additional costs by price relaxes.

关 键 词：供应链 可再生能源 收益 分配 政策 

分 类 号：F724[经济管理—产业经济]