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作 者:吴智峰[1]
出 处:《山东商业职业技术学院学报》2013年第1期20-23,共4页Journal of Shandong Institute of Commerce and Technology
摘 要:传统经济学假设市场交易双方在拥有完全对等的信息情境下进行相对公平交易。然而现实的供需市场交易过程由于主客观等多方面的原因,交易双方信息不对称现象普遍广泛存在。供需双方作为两个独立的经济体,在各自利益最大化的目标驱使下,极易陷入信息不对称的市场博弈囚徒困境,从而给双方都带来巨大的现实或潜在的危害。本文分析了不对称信息下供需双方在关键物资、瓶颈物资、常规物资中的市场博弈及彼此遭遇的经济损失,从而得出企业在存在一定利益冲突的信息不对称的市场博弈中,对供应商管理的实质为信任管理与竞争管理。Traditional economics assumes that both sides in the market conduct the transaction under the i- dentical information situation fairly. However, due to subjective and objective reasons, both parties share asymme- try information. Both parties as two independent economic bodies, going after their respective maximum interests, they are easily falling into the dilemma of asymmetric information, which gives both bring enormous realistic or po- tential harm. This paper analyses the economic losses in market games of key materials and supplies, bottleneck materials and general materials between the two parties and gets the conclusion that supplier management is in fact the essence of trust management and competition management.
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