高管变更与盈余管理——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控的实证研究  

Executive Turnover and Earnings Management: An Empirical Test based on Accruals and Real Activities Manipulation

作　　者：林永坚[1] 王志强[2] 李茂良[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院财务系 [2]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2013年第1期4-14,23,共12页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70972111);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2011221035)资助

摘　　要：本文将应计项目操控和真实活动操控纳入分析框架,研究上市公司发生总经理变更后的盈余管理行为。理论分析表明,新任总经理在上任当年利用应计项目负向盈余管理可"一举多得",利用真实活动进行盈余管理却可能会"损公不利己";而在后续年度利用真实活动正向盈余管理虽会"损公"却可"利己"。以沪深A股上市公司2005-2010年数据为样本进行的实证检验结果显示,在总经理变更当年,上市公司存在利用应计项目调减利润的盈余管理行为,但不存在利用真实活动的盈余管理行为。在新任总经理上任后第一、二个完整会计年度,上市公司存在利用应计项目和真实活动调增利润的盈余管理行为。总经理变更当年,如果董事长也发生变更,则上市公司在变更当年利用应计项目调减利润的程度更大,在变更后第一、二个完整会计年度利用应计项目和真实活动调增利润的程度也显著更大。Bringing accruals and real activities earnings management into the framework of analysis, this paper empirically tests the effect of executive turnover on earnings management. Theoretical analysis suggest that in the year of general manager turnover, the new general manager uses accruals to manage earnings downward can achieve many things at One stroke, while if he uses real activities to manage earnings upward or downward in the year of general manager turn- over will harm others without benefiting itself any way. In the follow- ing year of general manager turnover, if new general manager uses real activities to manage earnings upwards will harm others but it can benefit itself. Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A Share list- ed companies between 2005 and 2010, our paper empirically exam- ines the relationship between general manager turnover and earnings management in the year of general manager turnover as well as the following year of general manager turnover. Following are our main research findings： The listed companies use accruals but not real ac- tivities to manage earnings downward in the year of general manager turnover, which is consistent with our hypothesis. We also find out that in addition to the reversing accruals, the listed companies also use real activities to manage earnings upward in the following year of general manager turnover, which is also completely consistent with our hypothesis. Our further studies show that the concurrent turnover of chairman and general manager will result in more accruals but not real activities earnings management downward in the year of general manager turnover. The concurrent turnover of chairman and general manager will result in more accruals as well as real activities earn- ings management upward in the following year of general manager turnover, which is also completely consistent with our hypothesis. Our findings enrich the studies on the relationship between executive turnover and earnings management and contribute to the literature by showing tha

关 键 词：应计盈余管理 真实盈余管理 高管变更 总经理变更 董事长变更 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]