普特南早期实在论的实用主义倾向  

A Reconstruction of Putnam's Early Scientific Realism

作　　者：葛欢欢[1] 

机构地区：[1]深圳大学哲学系,广东深圳518060

出　　处：《深圳大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2013年第1期107-113,共7页Journal of Shenzhen University：Humanities & Social Sciences

摘　　要：普特南早期研究的重点在于用实在论观点解释科学革命的现实。研究者一般把他这一时期的观点归于塞拉斯、夏皮尔等人的科学实在论阵营,并且认为他日后的内在实在论和实用主义实在论是对这一立场的完全背离。事实上,此时普特南的思想中已经包含了反对一般科学实在论的观点。他通过反思卡尔纳普、蒯因、库恩等人的思想,形成了一种可以相容于实用主义图景的实在论观点并贯彻于日后的思考中。这主要包括:数学、逻辑学的抽象对象需要实在论解释,其存在问题则依赖于我们的表征;不仅物理学,而且数学、逻辑学都具有准经验基础,是可错的;科学语词的指称是固定的,它并非相对于概念框架。Putnam＇s early research focused on how to explain scientific revolution in a picture of realism. Researchers always interpreted him as a scientific realist, such as W.S.Sellars and D.Shapere, and insisted that his theory of internal realism and pragmatic realism totally violated his early thought. In fact, he has criticized traditional scientific realism in the very beginning. By criticizing Carnap, Quine and Kuhn, Putnam developed a new theory of realism, which could be consistent with pragmatism and has always run through the development of his thought. It mainly includes： 1） the abstract objects of mathematics and logics should be explained by realism, but their existence would depend on our representations; 2） physics, mathematics and logics has empirical foundation and is fallible; 3） the reference of a scientific term is fixed and is not relative to our conceptual frameworks.

关 键 词：表征 实在论 唯名论 准经验论 可错论 

分 类 号：B712[哲学宗教—外国哲学]