第二类代理问题、大股东制衡与公司创新投资  

Type Ⅱ Agency Problem,Blockholders Counterbalance and Corporate Innovation Investment

作　　者：左晶晶[1] 唐跃军[2] 眭悦[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《财经研究》2013年第4期38-47,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802015);上海市教育委员会科研创新重点项目(13ZS009)

摘　　要：文章基于终极控制权理论和来自中国上市公司的经验证据研究发现:(1)被第二类代理问题左右的控股股东缺乏进行持续高水平公司创新投资的动力;(2)提高其他大股东持股比例有助于推动上市公司更多地进行研发和创新投资;(3)民营上市公司其他大股东制衡有助于提高研发与创新投资,而国有控股上市公司的其他大股东则未能发挥其应有的监督与制衡作用。Based on the theory of ultimate control right and empirical evidence from listed companies in China, it reaches conclusions as follows： firstly, controlling shareholders involved in type II agency problem are defi- cient in the motivation for consistent high-level innovation investment; sec- ondly, the increase in the shareholding of other large shareholders is benefi- cial to the promotion of R^D and innovation investment in listed companies; thirdly, other large shareholders counterbalance in private listed companies is contributive to the increase in R＆D and innovation input and other large shareholders in state-owned listed companies can not play their due supervi- sion and counterbalance roles.

关 键 词：第二类代理问题 两权偏离 大股东制衡 创新投资 终极控制权 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]