基于创投双方潜在努力的最优融资契约研究  

The study of the optimal financing contract with unobserved effort of entrepreneurs and investors

作　　者：陈逢文[1] 徐纯琪[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第3期642-649,共8页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71102063);中央高校基本科研"研究生科技创新基金"(CDJXS11021118)

摘　　要：创业企业普遍存在着资金短缺的问题,创业投资则有效解决了创业企业的融资困难.一旦投资者进入到创业活动中,项目要想成功就需要企业家和投资者付出一定的努力.此时投资者需要最优的融资契约,以此激励企业家付出高水平的努力,使自己的利润最大化.本文在努力水平事先隐藏且无法核实的前提下,通过建立一个两阶段的融资模型,得到了两份优化的融资契约.论文进一步表明,企业家努力的边际成本与投资预期净现值的相对大小是进行融资契约选择的关键影响因素,即当投资预期净现值相对于努力成本较小时,不存在可行的契约;当投资预期净现值相对于努力成本较大时,最优融资契约将以两种形式出现:不论第一期的利润额多少,第二阶段再融资概率都接近于1的(FC1)和根据第一期的利润额确定第二阶段再融资概率的(FC2).由于双边道德风险的存在,无论投资者选择何种融资契约,都不会在投资的第二阶段与企业家共同努力.There are generally the problems of shortage of funds in enterprises, and venture capital is effective to solve their financing difficulties. Once investors enter into entrepreneurial activities, it needs entrepreneurs and investors to pay some effort to make the project successful. At this time the investor requires the optimal financial contract to induce the entrepreneur to choose high effort to maximize his profit. With hidden effort ex ante, this paper gets two optimization financing contracts by studying a two-period financing model. Further the paper states that the relative size of entrepreneurs＇ marginal cost of efforts and the expected net present value of investment is the key influencing factor for the choice of financing contracts. When the marginal cost of effort is relatively too high as compared to the expected NPV, then no feasible contracts will exist. But if exerting high effort is relatively less costly as compared to the expected NPV, the optimal financial contract will take two forms, which are （FC1） whose refinancing probabilities of the second stage are both set equal to 1 regardless of the first-period profit and （FC2） with the refinancing probabilities made contingent on the first-period profit. With the existence of double moral hazard, no matter the investor chooses which financing contract, he doesn＇t need to work together with entrepreneurs in the second stage of the investment.

关 键 词：创业投资 双边道德风险 潜在努力 融资契约 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]