超越经验主义与理智主义:从意向性到交互肉身性——现象学认识论的演变轨迹  

Transcending Empiricism and Rationalism : From Intentionality to Intercorporeity——Evolution of the Phenomenological Epistemology

作　　者：陈巍[1] 郭本禹[2] 

机构地区：[1]绍兴文理学院心理学系,浙江绍兴312000 [2]南京师范大学心理学院,南京210097

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2013年第3期20-24,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(10YJC720052);南京师范大学全国优秀博士学位论文培育项目(2011BS0003);绍兴文理学院人才引进启动项目(20125032)

摘　　要：经验主义与理智主义都接受了笛卡尔实体二元论的预设,将心智与世界、主体与客体决然对立与割裂开来。现象学拒绝接受这样一种非此即彼的认识论。这集体体现在:首先,通过对"意向性特质"与"意向性质料"关系的澄清及其对自我与他人关系的论证,胡塞尔的意向性学说深入批判了经验主义与理智主义的谬误。随后,借助运动意向性、触摸的知觉体验等现象学还原,梅洛-庞蒂的肉身间性学说论证了身体在意向性活动上的地位,从而深化了这种批判的效力。从意向性与交互肉身性的观念演变,推动现象学在认识论上成功地超越了经验主义与理智主义的立场。Both empiricism and rationalism accepted the presupposes of Cartesian dualism, which made a highly problematic dichotomy between mind and world, or subiect and object. Phenomenology refused this ＂either/or＂ epistemology and made a considerable effort to remedy it. First- ly, Husserl＇s theory of intentionality criticized the fallacy in empiricism and rationalism by clarifying the relationship between ＂intentional mat- ter＂ and ＂intentional quality＂ and proofing the relationship between self and others. Then, Merleau-Ponty＇s theory of intercorporeity demon- strated that body found a key place in the intentional action by using phenomenological reduction of ＂motor intentionality＂ and experience of ＂in touch＂, which further deepened the critical strength. In short, the evolution of phenomenological concepts--from intentionality to intercorpo- reity promoted the phenomenology succeeded beyond the empiricism and rationalism in terms of epistemology.

关 键 词：经验主义 理智主义 现象学 意向性 交互肉身性 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]