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作 者:孙刚[1]
机构地区:[1]宁波工程学院经济与管理学院,浙江宁波315211
出 处:《山西财经大学学报》2013年第3期78-89,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基 金:2010年度国家自然科学基金面上项目"税制改革与公司财务决策研究:基于中国资本市场的经验分析"(70972060);浙江省教科规划课题(SCG232)
摘 要:本文研究了上市公司避税行为对债务融资成本的影响。作为债务融资的主要提供者,债权人须权衡企业避税的成本和收益,并将其纳入信贷决策定价过程。研究发现,企业避税程度越高,债务融资成本越低,并且这种关系主要表现在处于税务稽查强度较强地区的企业中。以机构投资者持股比例作为衡量公司治理水平变量,进一步考察发现,税务稽查对企业避税与债务融资成本负向关系的促进作用,在机构投资者持股比例较低的公司样本中尤为明显。本研究对债权人更好地了解企业避税的经济后果,发挥税务稽查的治理功能,认识外部税务稽查与内部公司治理的替代作用,提供了理论和实践方面的经验证据。The paper studies the influence of tax avoidance on cost of private debt financing for Chinese listed firms. As main providers of debt financing, the creditors have to trade-off the costs and benefits of tax avoidance and put it into debt pricing decision. The evidence indicates that the more tax avoidance the lower cost of debt financing and this negative relationship is more significant in firms located at areas with more intense tax monitoring. In addition, utilizing institutional investors' holdings as corporate governance proxy, the evidence also presents that the positive effect of taxation monitoring on the negative association between tax avoidance and cost of debt financing is more apparent for firms with lower institutional investors' holdings. The study contributes to the understanding of economic consequence of tax avoidance for debt providers and the corporate governance role of tax monitoring and the substitute function of tax monitoring and internal corporate governance as well.
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