债务监督效应：基于财务重述的实证研究  

Monitoring Role of Debt: An Empirical Study on Financial Restatement

作　　者：何威风[1] 刘启亮 罗乐[3] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]斌汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072 [3]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2013年第3期113-124,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“管理者特征、盈余管理与晋升激励研究”(71102168);教育部人文社会科学基金项目“控股股东自利动机下的企业财务重述行为研究”(10YJC790081);中国博士后特别资助基金项目“薪酬管制下的管理者晋升动机盈余管理研究”(201104469)

摘　　要：从财务重述视角研究了债务监督效应,发现财务重述后银行贷款利率会提高,贷款总额会减少,保护性条款会趋严,但财务重述前后的银行贷款期限差异并不显著。研究发现,财务重述性质对银行贷款政策没有影响,非国有控股上市公司财务重述会比国有控股上市公司获得更少的银行贷款总额,制度环境差的地区的上市公司财务重述会比制度环境好的地区的上市公司获得更少的银行贷款总额和更严格的贷款保护性条款;财务重述公司治理的改善不会影响银行对其的贷款政策。This article makes the supervisory role of the debt from the perspective of the financial restatement. The results show that, compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, less loan size and more stringent requirements to protect. But there is no difference between bank loan maturities. Further study shows that the nature of the financial restatement has no effect on the lending policy, non-state-owned listed companies which restated their financial re- statement will receive less bank loans, the listed company which is in the developed environment will receive less bank loans and more stringent requirements to protect. Chinese banks still can not adjust lending policy according to the state of corporate governance.

关 键 词：债务监督 财务重述 银行贷款 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]