基于产品服务系统的供应链共享合同设计  

Supply Chain Revenue Sharing Contract Design Based on Products Services System

作　　者：乔华国[1] 江志斌[2] 谢文明[1] 刘维树[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海200030 [2]上海交通大学机械与动机工程学院,上海200240 [3]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2013年第1期25-30,共6页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70932004);博士点基金项目(20090073110035);上海市教委2009年度科研创新重点项目(09ZZ19)

摘　　要：考虑单一销售商和单一生产商组成的两阶段供应链,生产商提供产品,销售商在产品基础上附加服务提供产品服务系统(PSS),PSS需求受供应链提前期影响。利用斯坦伯格均衡和纳什讨价还价均衡理论,设计了生产商与销售商的协调模型,分析了生产商与销售商之间的收益共享机制。研究表明:供应链成员都能在合作博弈中取得更高利润;无论在合作博弈还是在非合作博弈中,销售商和生产商的投入都满足固定比例,且这个比例在非合作博弈中更大;无论销售商议价能力多大,生产商有动机接受合作博弈,获得不低于不合作时的利润;销售商的议价能力直接决定了额外利润的分享比例。In this paper, we considered a two-stage supply chain with one retailer and one manufacturer. In this supply chain, the manufacturer provides products and the retailer provides product service ,,system （PSS） in which additional service is attached to the original products,and demands in PSS is influenced by Lead time of supply chain. With knowledge of Stackelberg Equilibrium and Nash Bargain Equilibrium, a model concerned with cooperating between retailer and manufacturer was built,and we analyzed the revenue sharing mechanism between retailer and manufacturer. Based on the analysis, we can draw several conclusions. Firstly, both of the retailer and the manufacturer can obtain higher profit in cooperative game. Secondly, the investment ratio between retailer and manufacturer is fixed either in the cooperative game or non-cooperative game and the ratio is larger in non-cooperative game. Moreover, regardless of relater＇s bargain power,the manufacturer will always accept cooperative game and can obtain profits no less than that can be acquired in non-cooperative game. Finally, bargain power of the retailer directly determines the ratio of sharing additional profits between the retailer and the manufacturer.

关 键 词：讨价还价 产品服务系统 收益共享 斯坦伯格均衡 

分 类 号：F270.1[经济管理—企业管理] C93[经济管理—国民经济]