逆向拍卖采购下的库存与定价联合决策  

Study on Joint Inventory-Pricing Decision-Making in Reverse Auction Procurement

作　　者：刘树人[1,2] 李维[2] 王娜[2] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105 [2]湘潭大学数学与计算科学学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《工业工程》2013年第1期99-104,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

摘　　要：研究单周期下零售商的联合采购与定价决策问题。在该问题中,零售商首先确定一个采购合同,然后供应商投标,通过逆向拍卖选取一个获胜的供应商进行采购,同时确定产品的零售价格,目标是最大化其期望利润。假定需求函数是乘式的,在一定的条件下,证明零售商的期望收益(不包括采购费用)是采购量的凹函数,从而得到其最优的采购与定价策略。特别对正态需求分布情形给出了零售商的采购量和利润函数的解析表达式,并进行数值计算与分析。结果表明参与拍卖的供应商数量越多或供应商对其边际生产成本的估价越分散对零售商越有利。The problem of joint procurement decision and pricing for a retailer in a single period setting is addressed. The retailer creates a procurement contract specifying payment for possible purchase quantity. Then, bidding invitation is issued in a reverse auction way. The won supplier has the right to make the de-cision about the quantity to be produced and delivered. Meanwhile, the retailer decides the price simulta-neously to maximize the expected profit. With the assumption that the stochastic demand is a product func-tion, under some relatively mild conditions, it is shown that the retailer＇s expected revenue （not including the procurement cost） is a concave function of the purchased quantity, leading to an optimal ordering and pricing decision for the retailer. Especially, analytical expressions for purchase quantity and expected prof-it under normal demand distribution for the retailer are obtained. Numerical analyses are made and results show that the retailer gets more expected profit when the number of suppliers participating in the auction increase or the suppliers＇ marginal costs are more diverse.

关 键 词：采购 逆向拍卖 定价 报童模型 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]