双重委托代理关系下内部审计治理有效性研究——基于角色冲突的视角  

Governance Function of Internal Audit under Dual Principle-agent Relationship——Based on role conflict perspective

作　　者：罗艳梅[1] 程新生[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江大学经济与工商管理学院 [2]南开大学公司治理研究中心 [3]南开大学商学院会计系

出　　处：《审计研究》2013年第2期58-67,共10页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71072095);黑龙江大学青年基金项目(项目批准号:QW201107)的研究成果

摘　　要：随着企业内部受托责任关系日益复杂,内部审计作为组织内部专业的管理控制机制,成为董事会和管理层共同实施控制的手段,在公司治理和企业管理中发挥作用。然而,双重领导容易产生董事长和总经理对治理任务要求不一致的角色冲突,影响内部审计治理活动。本文以内部审计双重领导为背景,以角色冲突为核心,结合董事长和总经理的权力配置,设计内部审计双重委托代理实验,比较在不同权力配置所形成的激励环境下,角色冲突对内部审计治理活动的影响。研究发现董事长和总经理的权力配置能够调节角色冲突对内部审计治理活动的影响,将内审经理的解聘权配置给董事长并提高董事长的相对权力有助于抑制角色冲突对内部审计治理活动的负面影响,提高内部审计的治理作用。With the changes in the external and internal environment, corporate accountabilities are becoming in- creasingly complex. As a professional management control mechanisms, internal audit play an important role in cor- porate governance and enterprise management based on the requirement of Board and Management. However, the dual leadership of the Board and Management made the internal audit easy to face inconsistent role conflict on governance task, which influence the effectiveness of governance function of internal audit. Using dual leadership as research background, using role conflict as research core, and introducing the power distribution of Chairman and general manager as a moderator, this paper constructs the dual prineiple-agent experiment of internal audit and compares the influence of role conflict on the governance behavior of internal auditor among different power distribution environments. The results show that power distribution can moderate the effect of role conflict on governance behavior of internal audit. When the dismissal right of internal auditor distributes to Chairman, and the Chairmen＇s relative power is higher than the general manager, it can inhibit the negative effect of role conflict and improve the governance effectiveness of internal audit.

关 键 词：内部审计 委托代理 角色冲突 权力配置 

分 类 号：F239.45[经济管理—会计学]