管理者权力、外部薪酬差距与公司业绩  

Managerial Power,External Compensation Dispersion and Corporate Performance

作　　者：张丽平[1] 杨兴全[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2013年第4期66-75,共10页Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70962005);国家社科基金项目(11XGL002);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0919)的资助

摘　　要：外部薪酬差距因引导管理层行为而具有一定的激励作用,管理者权力又是影响薪酬激励有效性的重要因素。本文选取2006—2010年的上市公司为样本,结合管理者权力,研究了外部薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响,并从在职消费的视角探讨了管理层行为在外部薪酬差距影响公司业绩中所起的中介作用。研究结果发现,我国上市公司管理层外部薪酬差距与公司业绩正相关,外部薪酬差距具有正面的价值激励效应,但是管理者权力抑制了外部薪酬差距的激励效应。进一步拓展检验发现,外部薪酬差距能够抑制管理层的在职消费,但管理者权力弱化了外部薪酬差距对在职消费的抑制作用。The external compensation dispersion has incentive effects for influencing management＇ s behav- ior, and managerial power is an important factor which influences the effectiveness of compensation incen- tive. Using the data from 2006 to 2010 of Chinese listed companies as samples, combining managerial pow- er, this paper study how external compensation dispersion influence corporate performance, and we discuss the intermediary role of management behavior plays in the relationship between external compensation disper- sion and corporate performance. The results show that the external compensation dispersion of Chinese listed companies is positive with corporate performance, the external compensation dispersion has positive incentive effect, but managerial power will curb the incentive effect of external compensation dispersion. We make a further study and find that, the external compensation dispersion can curb the level of executive perquisites, but managerial power weaken the inhibitory effect of external compensation dispersion to executive perquisites.

关 键 词：管理者权力 外部薪酬差距 公司业绩 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]