企业劳动考评机制的行为经济学分析  

作　　者：孙敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2013年第3期96-100,共5页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：2010年教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(青年)项目"基于行为经济学的创业决策研究"(批准号:10YJC790324)

摘　　要：评述了主流经济学的企业劳动考评机制理论的特点及不足,并借鉴行为经济学及其前景理论,针对雇佣双方的参照依赖和损失规避等行为特点,提出雇主劳动考评机制的行为选择模型和雇员针对一定劳动考评机制的行为选择模型,这些行为选择模型更符合经验现实且简单易行,强调雇主在劳动考评机制设计执行上应遵守行业规范,学习先进同类企业以确保外部竞争力。同时,应确保劳动收益分配的内部公平性,并通过塑造优秀员工来引导雇员行为。The paper reviews the features and disadvantages of firm labor appraisal mechanism of mainstream economics. Based on employee and employer behavioral characteristics of reference dependence and loss aversion, it applies the prospect theory of behavioral economics to constructing employee and employer behavior choice models in labor appraisal, which are more simple, practical and congruent with the reality. It proposes that employers should follow industrial norms, learn from leading firms to keep external competitiveness, ensure internal compensation equity, and guide employee behaviors by cultivating model employees.

关 键 词：劳动考评机制 雇佣 行为经济学 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]