公司治理机制与公司绩效:代理成本的中介效应  

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Performance with Agency Costs as Mediators

作　　者：周建[1,2] 袁德利[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《预测》2013年第2期18-25,共8页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872048);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-08-0302);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(11JJD63000);南开大学"985工程"中国企业管理与制度创新基地资助项目(1050821210)

摘　　要：公司治理机制对公司绩效产生影响的途径日益引起学界的重视,但有关这一问题的实证研究相对缺乏。本文基于2001～2009年间沪深两市444家上市公司的平衡面板数据,采用能有效控制内生性问题的随机效应模型和系统GMM模型,检验了公司治理机制对股权代理成本的影响及公司治理机制、两类股权代理成本与公司绩效之间的关系。研究结果表明,第一类股权代理成本在董事会规模、董事会独立性与公司绩效之间起部分中介作用,而第二类股权代理成本在股权集中度与公司绩效之间起部分中介作用。Scholars pay attention to the ways through which corporate governance mechanisms affect corporate perform- ance increasingly, but now the related empirical researches are insufficient. Using the balanced panal data of 444 com- panies listed on Shanghai or Shenzhen stock markets from 2001 to 2009, and with the random effects models and the sys- tem GMM models that to some extent can control endogeneity effectively, the paper tests the relationship between corpo- rate governance mechanisms, the two kinds of equity agency costs and corporate performance. Results suggest that the first kind of equity agency cost is the mediator variable between the size of board of directors, the board independence and corporate performance, while the second kind of equity agency cost is the mediator variable between ownership concentration and corporate performance, both mediator variables take partial mediating effects.

关 键 词：公司治理机制 股权代理成本 公司绩效 中介效应 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]