一种新的BT协议激励机制  

A New Incentive Mechanism of Bittorrent Protocol

作　　者：马元飞[1] 王顺利[1] 马燕林[2] 

机构地区：[1]集宁师范学院计算机系,内蒙古乌兰察布012000 [2]内蒙古大学计算机学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010021

出　　处：《计算机与现代化》2013年第3期135-138,共4页Computer and Modernization

摘　　要：BT系统的健壮性与稳定性受到参与节点合作程度的影响,然而大多数参与者的行为是自私的,常以最大化下载量和最小化上传量的方式进行下载,这种"搭便车"行为对BT系统的负载均衡及整体性能会产生严重的影响。本文从BT协议激励机制角度出发,提出一种新的激励算法,并将它集成到BT协议的CPN模型中,通过CPN TOOLS仿真模拟和验证分析说明该算法可以有效抑制搭便车行为,提升BT系统性能。Robustness and stability of BT system is influenced by the degree of cooperation between nodes.Most of the nodes＇ behavior is selfish which maximize downloads and minimize uploads,this free-riding behavior has serious impact on system load balancing and overall performance.This paper proposes a new incentive algorithm according to original BT incentive mechanism,integrates it to BT＇s CPN model and then makes a verification and performance analysis using CPN TOOLS,the results show this new algorithm can avoid free-riding behavior and improve system performance.

关 键 词：BT协议 激励机制 CPN 验证 搭便车 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]