基于决策者自信不足下的垄断模型及供应链的协调研究  

Research on Monopoly Model and Coordination of Supply Chain System Based on Underconfident Decider

作　　者：王宣涛[1] 张玉林[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,南京211189

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第3期31-36,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71171046;70771026;71201053);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(CXLX12-0130)

摘　　要：将自信不足系数引入传统的报童模型,探讨随机需求下垄断厂商自信不足对自身产生影响的机理,发现自信不足会降低厂商的利润。在分散式供应链条件下,理性的供应商可以运用两部定价契约对自信不足的零售商进行管理,使得分散式供应链利润达到集中决策下供应链利润的最高水平,并实现对供应链利润在供应商和零售商之间的任意分配。This paper discusses the mechanism of how the under confidence of the monopoly seller impacts its decision under stochastic demand by introducing underconfident coefficient into the traditional newsvendor model. It is pointed out that the monopoly seller＇s underconfidence decreases its profit. In the decentralized supply chain, it imagines that a rational manufac- turer is attempting to manage an underconfident retailer with a two - part tariff, which can make the profit of the supply chain attain the benchmark of a centralized system with the highest level and allow arbitrary splitting of the total profit of the supply chain between the supplier and the retailer.

关 键 词：自信不足 分散式供应链 两部定价契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]