双边不对称信息下风险规避型供应链的激励协调  

Incentives and Coordination in Risk-averse Supply Chain with Bilateral Asymmetric Information

作　　者：黄梅萍[1,2] 汪贤裕[2] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学土木工程学院,福建福州350108 [2]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《贵州大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第1期126-135,共10页Journal of Guizhou University:Natural Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71071103);福州大学科研启动项目(0460-022509)

摘　　要：为了分析制造商和销售商各自拥有的私人信息和风险态度对供应链激励及协调的影响,文章基于委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,仅代表制造商和销售商的效用之和,建立含有风险规避者的供应链双向激励及协调模型,并得到了在该情形下供应链实现协调的条件。最后,借助数值分析发现:当制销双方的风险规避度一定时,双边不对称信息的存在使得链的协调受到一定的限制;而在此基础上,当制销双方的风险规避效应增大时,协调的条件则变得更加的严格。In a two-level supply chain, both the manufacturer and retailer have their respective private information and risk attitude. In order to analyze their impact on supply chain＇s incentives and coordination, a virtual third-party was introduced as a selfless principal. Then a model of double incentives and coordination in risk-averse supply chain was established to obtain the condition of the supply chain coordination. Finally, numerical simulation shows that if the manufacturer and retailer keep a certain risk-averse degree, the coordination is sub- jected to certain restriction because of bilateral asymmetric information. And based on this, when the manufac- turer and retailer＇s risk-averse effect increases, the condition of supply chain coordination is more stringent.

关 键 词：风险规避 双边不对称信息 供应链协调 虚拟第三方 委托代理 均值-方差分析 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]