产业架构下互补性资产划分与创新者获利决策  

Partition of Complementary Asset and Benefiting Decision-making of Innovator under Industrial Architecture

作　　者：何婧[1] 杜义飞[1] 杨振华[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610064

出　　处：《技术经济》2013年第3期1-6,共6页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金项目"基于产业结构和Biform博弈模型的创新价值获取研究"(70802009)资助;国家自然科学基金面上项目"‘双向依赖’下后发企业创新行为倾向;困境与吸收能力研究"(71272131)资助

摘　　要：从产业架构层面,结合WiMAX创新联盟及其获利决策过程,对创新者的获利决策问题进行了理论研究。基于合作博弈结构图和划分函数建立数学模型,通过刻画不同产业架构下的价值创造特征函数,得出不同产业架构如何影响互补性和移动性的命题,进而给出不同产业架构下创新者的价值创造与获利的统一决策模型和命题。研究发现:互补性紧密联系价值创造的一面,移动性刻画了价值获取的另一面;创新者在高度集中的产业结构下倾向于与垄断互补资产企业合作,在分散的产业结构下倾向于限制许可。This paper focuses on the problem arising from benefiting by investors, which is studied on the industrial architecture layer and derived from WiMAX innovation association and its benefit decision process. Based on the present game structure figure and function division, it constructs a model. The description of value creating characteristic function under partition structure deduces the propositions that how different industrial architectures impact the complementary and mobility. Furthermore, it gives the unified decision making model of innovators creating value and benefiting. The results show as follows：the complementary relates to the aspect of value creation and the mobile describes the other aspect of value appropriation,and the innovator prefers to cooperate with the monopoly firm with complementary assets under concentrated industries, and prefers to limit licenses under scattering industries.

关 键 词：互补性资产 划分 产业架构 创新者获利 决策 

分 类 号：F276.4[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]