商业银行员工绩效考核与操作风险防范的博弈研究  

Research on Game between Performance Evaluation and Prevention of Operational Risk on Part of Commercial Bank Employees

作　　者：郭玉冰[1,2] 张力婕[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学,山西太原030006 [2]太原科技大学,山西太原030024

出　　处：《山西高等学校社会科学学报》2013年第3期47-49,共3页Social Sciences Journal of Universities in Shanxi

基　　金：山西省2012年软科学项目(2012041019-01)"山西国有商业银行绩效考核指标体系创新研究"

摘　　要：商业银行的操作风险,因其产生的损失越来越多而引起了监管层和国内学者的高度关注。通过文献检索发现,从绩效考核角度来研究操作风险防范的较少。从博弈论的角度将绩效考核制定主体与操作风险实施主体处于博弈的主体位置,通过建立博弈模型来分析双方的策略,从而得出绩效考核制定的完善性与操作风险防范程度有关联性。旨在通过研究结果对今后从绩效考核视角来研究操作风险防范的可行性提供理论及实践指导依据。The operational risk of commercial banks is attracting more and more widespread attention from the regulators and domestic scholars due to their increasing loss.A review and an examination of the literature help people find that there are fewer researches about the prevention of operational risks from the perspective of performance evaluation.So,this paper,from the angle of game theory,puts the subject of performance evaluation and the subject of risk operation in the position of subject in game,establishes a game model to analyze the strategy of the both sides,and arrives at the conclusion that there exists a correlation beween the perfect setting on performance evaluation and the degree of guarding against operational risks.The paper therefore intends to provide both theoretical and practical guidance for the study about prevention of operational risks from the angle of performance evaluation.

关 键 词：商业银行 绩效考核 操作风险 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]