盈余管理、高管薪酬敏感度和股权结构  

Earnings Management,Top Executives Compensation and Pay-performance Sensitivity and Shareholding Structure

作　　者：杨晋渝[1,2] 刘斌[1] 孙立[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]加州大学河滨分校安德鲁森管理学院,加利福尼亚州河滨92521 [3]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第2期70-76,共7页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"公允价值;行为异化与经济后果"(70972055);国家留学基金委2010年"国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目"(留金发[2010]3006号)

摘　　要：文章研究了新会计准则实施后上市公司的盈余管理行为,以及高管薪酬如何受到盈余管理后的盈余影响,发现公司普遍通过投资收益进行盈余管理,投资收益显著提高高管薪酬水平。进一步研究了股权结构对盈余管理行为和薪酬业绩敏感度的影响,结果表明国有控股、股权集中的公司盈余管理程度和高管薪酬业绩敏感度低于非国有控股、股权分散的公司。说明国有控股、股权集中的公司可以有效抑制管理层的盈余管理行为,但是对薪酬业绩敏感度没有治理作用。This paper researches on the earnings management of Chinese listed companies after the application of new accounting rules,and how the earnings after earnings management influence the top executives compensation.The result suggests that there is a widespread earnings management through investment income among companies and investment income significantly improves the level of top executives compensation.In addition,this paper researches on the effect of shareholding structure on the earnings management and pay-performance sensitivity.The result also suggests that the degrees of earnings management and pay-performance sensitivity in state control and shareholder concentration companies are much lower than those in non-state control and shareholder dispersion companies.State control and shareholder concentration companies can restrain the earnings management,but can not improve pay-performance sensitivity.

关 键 词：投资收益 盈余管理 薪酬敏感度 股权结构 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]