从委托代理理论思考我国当前反腐败的路径选择  

On Current Anti-Corruption in China: on the Theory of Principal-Agent

作　　者：薛虹[1] 刘光顺[2] 

机构地区：[1]南通大学现代教育技术中心,江苏南通226019 [2]南通大学政治学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《新疆大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第6期22-27,共6页Journal of Xinjiang University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：当前公职人员违法犯罪呈现出涉案人员级别越来越高、金额越来越大、越来越公开化、团体作案增多等新特点。文章结合委托代理的理论,提出:增强官员权力来自于人民的意识,出台保障新闻传媒监督的法案,创新民众获取信息新机制,制定弹劾纠错机制的启动程序,促进非政府组织的更加健康发展等,进行系统的顶层设计,来预防和遏制官员的腐败行为。In China’s legal system today,the general public and public employee have a special relationship of principal-agent.Today some illegal crimes by public employees present new features： higher ranking officials;larger amount of money;more group crimes,etc.To control corruptions,the government must make detailed terms on their power scope and the role of different department,stipulate laws on protecting the supervision from Mass media,create a new mechanism for people to get relevant information,put forward the startup procedure for impeachment and mistake corrections and promote the healthy development of NGO.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 人民代表大会制度 系统论 反腐倡廉 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]