不完全信息下存货质押业务中参与多方博弈行为分析  

Analysis on the Game Behavior of Multi-participator in Inventory Pledge Business with Incomplete Information

作　　者：何娟[1,2] 蒋祥林[2] 王建[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都610031 [2]复旦大学金融研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2012年第12期105-109,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71003082;71273214);全国博士后基金项目(20080430602);四川省科技计划软科学项目(2010ZR0028);四川省教育厅人文社会科学研究基地(川酒发展研究中心)重点项目(CJZ11-01);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(SWJTU11CX081);复旦大学经济学院985平台项目

摘　　要：文章引入机制设计理论,建立供应链金融管理中考虑防范物流企业与借款企业合谋银行契约设计的三阶段博弈模型:第一阶段为完全信息下单阶段行为博弈——Stackelberg博弈;第二阶段为不完全信息奖惩机制约束下的行为博弈;第三阶段为重复博弈。结果显示,不完全信息下奖励比惩罚更有效;银行应与物流企业建立长期合作关系避免单次交易,使物流企业有追随声誉效应的积极性。研究发现,物流企业最难作出决策的风险偏好区间(0.65,0.75),此时银行适当上调奖励因子可避免物流企业包庇借款企业。所得结论为银行与物流企业生产决策提供支持。In order to prevent the collusion between the logistics enterprise and the borrower in inventory financing,three stage models are established in this paper on the basis of mechanism design theory.The first stage is Stackelberg game of single trans action with complete information.The second stage is the game of considering reward and punishment mechanism with incom plete information.And the last stage is repeated game.The results show that the reward is more effective than punishment with incomplete information.Banks should establish long-term relationship with logistics enterprise to avoid the single transaction,and logistics enterprises are active in pursuing the reputation effect.This paper also finds out that the risk appetite interval is（0.65,0.75）,where it is the most difficult to make a decision for the logistic enterprise.In this condition,it will not cover up the borrower when the bank increases the reward factor reasonably.These conclusions above will support the decisions of both bank and logistics enterprise.

关 键 词：存货质押业务 不完全信息 合谋 奖惩机制 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]