垄断企业高管薪酬制度的有效性研究——来自沪深上市公司的经验证据  

On the Effectiveness of Executive’s Pay System of Monopoly Enterprises:Empirical Evidences from the Listing Corporations in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets

作　　者：马强[1] 孙剑平[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2013年第2期35-45,共11页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部社科司规划基金项目(12YJA630087);江苏省六大人才高峰资助项目(2011-JY-002)

摘　　要：采用2000-2010年上市公司的样本数据,基于完全竞争企业的对比考察垄断企业薪酬制度的有效性。实证结果发现:垄断企业高管人员薪酬激励与公司当期短期业绩显著正相关的证据,与完全竞争行业企业相比较,垄断企业高管人员薪酬激励与公司当期短期业绩相关系数更高;由于垄断企业股权激励受政府严格管制,股权激励的"金手铐"未起作用,垄断企业高管人员股权激励与公司业绩不相关,完全竞争行业的股权激励的薪酬激励相对于垄断行业更有效。By making use of the sample data from the listed corporations from 2000 to 2010,this paper studies the effectiveness of the salary system of monopoly enterprises based on the comparison between the fully competitive enterprises.The empirical results indicate that significant positively related evidences can be found between the pay incentive of the executives of monopoly enterprises and the current short-term performance of the enterprises.Compared with the enterprises of the fully competitive industries,the correlation coefficient between the pay incentive of the executives of monopoly enterprises and the current short-term performance of the enterprises is even higher.However,due to the fact that the equity incentive of monopoly enterprises is severely regulated by the government,so the＂golden handcuff＂of equity incentive does not work.Therefore,there is no direct link between the executive’s equity incentive and the enterprise’s performance;the pay incentive system of the fully competitive enterprises is much more efficient than that of the monopoly enterprises.

关 键 词：垄断企业 高管薪酬 业绩敏感度 股权激励 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]