附加资源与环境保护约束的矿业权招标出让机制设计  

A Bidding Transfer Mechanism Imposed on a Constraint of Resource and Environment Protection

作　　者：段涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南工业大学管理学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《生态经济》2013年第5期102-104,共3页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(09CJY002)

摘　　要：在矿业权拍卖出让过程中,政府不仅要使矿业权以尽可能高的价格出让,还要充分考虑资源高效利用与环境保护等非价格因素。然而,迄今我国的矿业权出让多为一维的价格竞争,缺乏能够实现地质环境保护与资源高效利用的出让机制。为此,文章设计了一种附加资源与环境保护约束的矿业权招标出让机制,并通过建立博弈模型来分析政府与投资者的均衡策略。研究表明,要求投资者增加资源与环境保护投入会导致矿业权出让收益减少,因此政府要在这两方面目标之间进行权衡,政府将根据边际条件确定最优的资源与环境保护投入。In the process of mining right auction, the goals of government are not only achieving high transferring fees, but also some non-price factors such as efficient utilization of resources and effective protection of environment. However, mining right.transfer in China is always a kind of one-dimensional bid competition. It lacks a bidding transfer mechanism available for environmental protection and efficient utilization of resource. This paper designs a bidding transfer mechanism imposed on a constraint of resource and environment protection, analyses the equilibrium strategies of government and investors by game analysis. The researches of this paper show that increase of investment on resource and environment protection leads to reduction of the transferring fee. Therefore government will balance the two goals and determine the optimal level of investment on resource and environment protection by boundary conditions.

关 键 词：矿业权 招标出让 资源与环境保护 均衡策略 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]