基于Stackelberg博弈的生鲜农产品供应链决策研究  

Fresh Produce Supply Chain Decisions based on Stackelberg Game

作　　者：王冲[1] 唐曼萍[1] 王莉莉[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川农业大学经济管理学院,成都611130 [2]四川农业大学生命科学与理学院,成都611130

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第4期99-101,105,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：四川省农村发展研究中心课题资助项目(CR1108;CR1103);四川农业大学双支计划资助项目(00470702;00470710)

摘　　要：针对生鲜农产品流通过程的巨大损耗,引入期权合同工具,基于Stackelberg博弈,研究一个供应商和一个零售商组成的单周期两阶段供应链的决策问题。在零售商既订购产品又订购期权的情况下,给出分散控制系统中零售商的最优产品订购和最优期权订购策略以及供应商的最优定价策略。经数值分析得到:产品损耗率与零售商的最优期权订购量和最优总订购量成正比,与最优产品订购量先成正比、再成反比;期权订购价与零售商的最优期权订购量和最优总订购量成反比,与最优产品订购量成正比。This paper investigates the role of options contracts in a two-stage supply chain in which a fresh produce supplier sells to a retailer based on Stackelberg game. The optimal product and option ordering policies for the retailer as well as the optimal pricing policies for the supplier are given in the decentralized system when the retailer order both products and op- tions. The result shows that the retailer＇ s optimal option and total ordering quantity are positive correlative to the circulation wastage rate but negative to the option ordering price, the optimal product ordering quantity is positive correlative to the op- tion ordering price and to the circulation wastage rate in a certain range.

关 键 词：生鲜农产品 STACKELBERG博弈 流通损耗 期权合同 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]