论D·刘易斯的模态实在论  

David Lewis’ Modal Realism

作　　者：刘张华[1] 

机构地区：[1]盐城师范学院经济法政学院,江苏盐城224051

出　　处：《广西民族师范学院学报》2013年第1期73-76,共4页

摘　　要：D·刘易斯的模态实在论是关于可能世界的一种解释理论。在与温和实在论的竞争中,受到了众多学者的批判而处于不利地位。刘易斯认为可能世界是"具体的"和"现实的,这种可能世界并不是极端意义上的世界,相反,却是表达了可能世界的平权。对应体关系取代跨界同一只是一种选择问题,是为避免莱布尼茨同一物不可辨别性原理的失效而采取的一种选择。总体来说,模态实在论虽有各种问题,但它本身是流畅的且具有其自身的优点。David Lewis＇ modal realism is an explanatory theory of possible worlds. In the competition with the moderate realism, modal realism is criticized by many modal logicians and is in an inferior position. This paper points out that Lewis believes possible worlds are concrete and actual, but the two concepts are not the meaning as usual. ＇ Actuality＇ is not absolute, but relative to the cognitive agent. And it is not the prerequisite to ＇ con- creteness＇ . The view shows that possible worlds have equal right of existence. In a word, modal realism has some defects, but the theory is coherent. And it has many advantages.

关 键 词：模态实在论 刘易斯 可能世界 对应体理论 

分 类 号：B815[哲学宗教—逻辑学]