中小企业股权融资与治理结构关系研究  

A Study of the Relationship of Equity Financing and Corporate Governance Structure of SME

作　　者：晓芳[1] 李存刚[1] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古财经大学会计学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010070

出　　处：《未来与发展》2013年第4期61-64,71,共5页Future and Development

基　　金：内蒙古中小企业发展研究基地<中小企业治理结构及股权融资研究>项目(ZJD10006)的研究成果之一

摘　　要：本文以中小企业板上市公司为研究对象,对其股权融资状况和公司治理结构做了定量描述研究,并考察了二者之间的关系。研究结果显示,中小企业板上市公司存在强烈的股权融资偏好,治理结构也不尽完善。强烈的股权融资偏好无法发挥债务的治理作用,也不利于形成股权制衡。中小企业较为集中的股权结构及其一股独大现象加剧了大股东与小股东之间的代理成本。基于此,本文最后提出了相关政策建议。In the paper, we choose SME board listed companies by the end of 2011 as research subjets, and make a quanti- tative description of equity financing and corporate governance structure, and then investigate the relationship between them. Our analysis shows SME board listed companies strongly preferred to equity financing and governance structure is not perfect. Because strong equity financing preference exists, the role of debt governance can＇t be played and Cheek-and- balance Ownership Structure can＇t be informed. Centralized Shares and single-largest-shareholder ownership structure ag- gravate the agency cost between the big and small shareholders. In the last, this paper puts forward relevant policy recom-mendations.

关 键 词：中小企业 股权融资 公司治理结构 代理成本 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]