控制权、规模与并购绩效——基于沪深制造业上市公司的实证研究  

Control Right,Scale and M&A Performance:An Empirical Study Based on Listed Manufacturing Corporations in Shanghai and Shenzhen

作　　者：于成永[1] 施建军[2] 方红[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学,210046 [2]对外经济贸易大学

出　　处：《国际贸易问题》2013年第5期128-142,共15页Journal of International Trade

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70972141;71272239)阶段性成果;江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目;中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20090460082);第三批博士后特别资助(201003563);江苏省高校优秀中青年教师和校长境外研究计划资助的支持

摘　　要：微观层面上,有关"国进民退"与"国退民进"的利弊之争核心在于控制权性质不同的企业是否具有不同的"趋利避害"能力。本文从控制权和规模扩张来剖析"趋利避害"的具体表现,研究其影响并购绩效的路径和机制。研究发现:(1)终极控制人在企业并购中存在支持与掏空行为;(2)随着规模扩张,企业并没有获得规模、范围经济以及垄断势力带来的混合正向效应;(3)相对于政府控制,非政府终极控制人具有较强的掏空能力(趋利),和降低规模、范围不经济和无明显的垄断势力的负面影响能力(避害)。本文研究价值在于,理论上发展了不同性质的控制人在价值分配(掏空)、价值转移(市场势力)和价值创造(规模、范围经济)上的能力差异;实践上,能够为监管层政策制定、实施与评估提供相应经验支持。Microscopically, the answering crux of the controversy over ＂ex-panding the public sector while retrenching the private＂ or its contrary lies in whether enterprises of different attributes in control rights are possessed of ＂abil-ities to draw on advantages and avoid disadvantages＂. From the control right and scale expansion viewpoint, this paper dives into such abilities of enterprise in a bid to study their impact pathway and mechanism on M＆A performance. As the findings suggest, firstly, in M＆A processes, propping and tunneling behav-iors are found on ultimate controllers; secondly, along with the scale expansion, the enterprise does not obtain positive mixed effect from the combination of econ-omies of scale and scope and monopoly; thirdly, as opposed to governmental con-trois, private ultimate controllers enjoy stronger tunneling ability （ability to utilize advantages） and negative abilities resulted from economies of non-scale and non-scope and absence of significant monopoly power （ability to avoid disadvan-tages）. This paper claims value by presenting the theoretical disparities in abili-ties of controllers of varied attributes in terms of value distribution （tunneling）, value transfer （market force） and value creation （economies of scale and scope）. The present study also provides practical support for regulators to refer to when formulating, implementing and evaluating policies.

关 键 词：控制权 控制权偏离 企业规模 并购规模 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]