考虑碳排放权的二级供应链碳减排Stackelberg模型  

Stackelberg Game Model for Two-Level Supply Chain with Allocation Mechanism of Carbon Emission Permit

作　　者：付秋芳[1] 忻莉燕[1] 马健瑛[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学国际工商管理学院,广东广州510420

出　　处：《工业工程》2013年第2期41-47,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目(10BJL026);广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划2010年度一般项目(GD10CGL19)

摘　　要：从转化和物流环节两个方面测量供应链多阶碳足迹,以制造商为核心企业,分别建立了政府碳排放权免费分配、阈值分配和完全市场交易机制下,碳减排率价格敏感型需求下的两级供应链碳减排Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了3种机制对供应链均衡决策的影响。研究结果表明:不同碳分配和交易机制影响供应链总收益和制造商转化环节碳减水平,碳排放权由免费分配至完全市场交易机制过渡时,对供应链碳减排的激励逐渐减小。The supply chain multi-stage carbon footprint is measured from the two aspects： conversion and logistics links. Then, by taking the manufacturer as the core business of the supply chain, Stackelberg game decision-making model of carbon sensitive supply chain is established under free allocation mecha- nism, the threshold allocation mechanism, and full market trading mechanism of carbon emission permit, respectively. Then the impact of the three mechanisms on supply chain balanced decisions is ana!yzed. The results show that different carbon emission permit allocation trading mechanisms affect the total receipts of the supply chain. It also shows that when the mechanism changes from free allocation mechanism to full market trading mechanism, carbon reduction rate in the manufacturing link and the incentive of supply chain carbon reduction gradually reduces.

关 键 词：供应链 碳排放权 碳减排 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]