竞争供应链R&D投资策略与协同机制研究  

R&D Investment Strategy and Synergy Mechanism of Supply Chain Firms under Competition Environment

作　　者：李卫红[1,2] 白杨[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]南京审计学院信息科学学院,江苏南京210029

出　　处：《工业工程》2013年第2期80-86,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901043);江苏省社科基金资助项目(12XSB014)

摘　　要：基于2个开展R&D活动的供应商和2个竞争制造商组成的链与链竞争模型,研究了技术溢出条件下供应链企业R&D投资策略与协同机制。研究结果表明,纵向R&D合作投资是供应链系统博弈的占优策略,此时供应链系统收益、R&D投资水平均高于不合作情况,并且适度的技术溢出有利于提高供应链企业创新热情。但对于供应链成员企业而言,在自利动机驱使下,仅在一个有限的R&D成本分担比例区间内做出的决策与供应链系统一致,只有在该区间对成员企业的利益进行协调才能实现R&D合作的协同性。为此设计了基于合作满意度的R&D成本分担机制,通过建立不对称NASH谈判模型较好地协调了合作双方的利益,促进了供应链R&D协同效应的实现。Technological innovation is an important way for a supply chain firm to gain competitive advan- tage. By using game theory, a model is presented for chain to chain competition with two suppliers engaged in R＆D and two competing manufacturers. With this model, the competition equilibrium, R＆D strategy and synergistic conditions of supply chains with technological spillovers are analyzed. Results show that vertical R＆D cooperation is the dominant strategy of supply chains to bring higher equilibrium profit and R＆D input level than those of firms without cooperation activities. It also shows that appropriate technolog- ical spillover can improve innovation enthusiasm of suppliers. However, suppliers and manufacturers select R＆D cooperation only in a finite R＆D cost allocation range due to their self - serving motives. The R＆D cost should be allocated in the interval such that the stability and synergy effect of R＆D cooperation can be reached. Thus, cost allocation mechanisms are designed based on cooperation satisfaction to realize the synergy effect of vertical R＆D cooperation, with which the benefits of both partners can be better coordina- ted by NASH negotiation model.

关 键 词：链与链竞争 技术溢出 纵向R&D合作 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]