报废产品回收激励与监督的竞争博弈模型  

Competition game model for incentive and supervision of EOL products recovery

作　　者：杨玉香[1] 周根贵[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国计量学院经济与管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310014

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第2期202-210,共9页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071142;71071146);浙江省高校人文社科重点资助项目(RWSKZD03-201206);浙江省标准化与知识产权管理人文社科重点研究基地资助项目(SIPM3301);浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地产业发展政策研究中心资助项目(12JDCY03YB);浙江省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(12JCGL20YB)

摘　　要：为使环保部门可持续发展战略的推进与企业逆向物流战略的实施达到互动与耦合,实现双方的共赢,利用双层规划、均衡理论及变分不等式研究工具,建立基于Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot竞争的报废产品回收激励监督策略决策系统,主方决策模型考虑环保部门以较低的激励监督成本尽可能提高环境效益,从方决策模型描述了网络中各决策者在不同激励监督策略下的竞争行为.给出了这一问题的求解策略,最后通过算例对模型的均衡结果进行了对比分析,为环保部门制定有效的激励监督策略提供了理论支持.In order to construct an interactive and coupling relationship between the strategy of sustainable development for the environmental protection department and the strategy of reverse logistics for all firms in the network, and to achieve win-win between them, by using the methods of bi-level programming, equilibrium theory and variation inequality, an incentive and supervision strategy decision model for end-of-life products recovery in Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot competition is established. In the leader decision model, the environ- mental protection department tries to promote environmental benefit at lower incentive and supervision costs. The follower decision model describes the competitive behaviors of the various decision-makers under differ- ent incentive and supervision strategies. A solution method is built. Finally, equilibrium results of the models, by solving numerical examples, are compared and analyzed. The conclusions can provide theoretic support for the environmental protection departments in designing effective policies.

关 键 词：变分不等式 网络均衡 逆向物流 报废产品 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]