IPO抑价还是破发——基于股权结构的实证研究  

IPO Underpricing or Overpricing——An Empirical Study Based on Equity Structure

作　　者：谢汉昌[1,2] 王金波[3] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005 [2]福建商业高等专科学校,福建福州350000 [3]厦门大学王亚南经济研究院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2013年第5期45-57,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"全球金融风暴背景下中国企业财务决策行为研究"(70972110)

摘　　要：针对近几年频发的IPO破发现象,选取2009~2011年718家中国A股上市公司作为研究样本,从股权结构特征以及影响IPO定价参与方的议价动机和能力入手,考察了股权结构与IPO抑价或破发的关系。研究发现,管理层持股比例与IPO抑价无显著关系,而与IPO破发显著负相关,体现出管理层持股的＂利益趋同效应＂;相比于非国有企业,国有企业IPO抑价程度更高,且IPO破发的概率更低,反映出国有企业管理层可能存在通过IPO抑价确保发行成功来获取政治声誉和寻求未来政治升迁的动机。Based on the frequency of IPO overpricing in recent years,this paper collects 718 Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2011 as research samples and examines the relationship between equity structure and IPO underpricing or overpricing,from the perspective of equity structure which embodies and affects bargaining motivation and ability of IPO pricing participation parties.The results indicate that managerial ownership is not related to IPO underpricing significantly and on the contrary negatively related to IPO overpricing,showing ＂the Convergence of Interest Effect＂.Compared to non-state-owned enterprises,the state-owned enterprises have a higher level of IPO underpricing and a smaller probability of IPO overpricing,implying that state-owned enterprise managers may employ IPO underpricing to ensure the successful issue to obtain political reputation and seek future political promotion.

关 键 词：股权结构 议价动机与能力 IPO抑价 IPO破发 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]