双重晋升层级、声誉与雇员专用性技能获得  

Dual Promotion Ranks,Reputation and Employee's Specific Skill Acquisition

作　　者：李晓颖[1] 张凤林[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学产业组织与企业组织研究中心,116025 [2]东北财经大学经济学院,116025

出　　处：《经济评论》2013年第3期19-29,76,共12页Economic Review

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"世界产业发展新趋势及我国培育发展战略性新兴产业跟踪研究"(项目编号:12&ZD068)的资助

摘　　要：在企业内,雇员专用性技能的获得会面临道德风险问题,从而导致其技能投资不足。已有研究分别从垂直晋升层级和水平晋升层级研究晋升在某种情况下能够解决这一问题。但是这些晋升方式都会产生一定的无效率,并且多是基于企业与雇员一次性博弈的环境,并没有考虑企业对声誉的关注。本文在一个重复博弈的框架中引入基于声誉的关系合约,分析既存在垂直晋升又存在水平晋升的双重层级结构对雇员技能获得的激励以及效率问题。分析表明,对于声誉较高的企业,双重晋升层级结构可以同时实现对雇员技能获得的激励以及有效的工作配置;且随着企业声誉的提高,企业会更多地依赖水平晋升层级、较少地依赖垂直晋升层级来诱使雇员技能的获得。In the enterprise,the employees with specific skill will face a moral hazard problem,leading to insufficient investment in their skills. Existing literatures have shown that promotion can solve this problem under some condition from vertical promotion ranks and horizontal promotion ranks respectively. But these solutions are inefficient, and they are based on one - shot game, disregarding the firm＇ s concern of reputation. In a repeated game framework,introducing the relational contract based on reputation,this paper takes into account the incentive and efficiency of dual promotion ranks for employee＇ s specific skill acquisition. The conclusions are ： for the firm with high reputation, dual promotion ranks can promote the employee＇ s skill acquisition and efficient allocation of work simultaneously. With the improvement of reputation,the firm will induce skill acquisition relying more on horizontal promotion ranks, and less on vertical promotion ranks.

关 键 词：专用性技能 晋升 声誉 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]