保兑仓融资模式下收益共享契约的参数设计  

REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT'S PARAMETER DESIGN IN THE FINACING MODE OF CONFIRMING STORAGE

作　　者：林强[1] 李苗[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2013年第4期430-444,共15页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：天津市科技发展战略研究计划项目(12LZLZF06000)资助课题

摘　　要：选择两阶段资金约束型供应链为研究对象,以零售商运营资金不足作为前提条件,分别构建了银行直接贷款时供应链合作双方的收益共享契约模型,和保兑仓模式下收益共享契约模型,应用Stackelberg博弈模型分别求解出分散决策下制造商的最优批发价格、收入分享比例,和零售商的最优订货量.对比两种融资模式发现,保兑仓模式下的最优订货量及供应链总利润均大于银行直接贷款模式.且保兑仓模式下的最大受益者仍是制造商,零售商并未获得更多利益.制造商的利润对收入共享系数具有单调递减的趋势,批发价格随收益共享系数的增大而增大.而零售商的利润并非单调增加,只有当共享系数超过某一数值后,零售商利润才会比银行直接贷款时大,双方才能实现利润提高,即实现改进供应链整体运作绩效的同时达到互惠双赢的目标.In this paper, we considered a two-level finance-constrained supply chain of a producer and a retailer. This paper models the supply chain revenue sharing contract of direct loans from banks and set up the revenue sharing model of con- firming storage pattern under the condition of the insufficiency of retailers＇ operating capital. In the situation of decentralized decision-making, we give manufacturers＇ op- timal wholesMe price, income share proportion and retailers＇ optimal order quantity by using the Stackelberg game model. By comparing the two financing models we see that the optimal order quantity and overall benefit of the supply chain is better in the confirming storage pattern than in the mode of direct loans from banks, mean- while we find that manufacturers is the biggest beneficiaries and retailers didn＇t gain more benefit. Manufacturers＇ profit decreases monotonically with the revenue sharing coefficient while the wholesale price increases with the coefficient. However retailers＇ profit doesn＇t increase monotonically, only when the sharing coefficient exceeds some level, retailers＇ profit will be larger than in the situation of getting direct loans from banks, which means we achieve the goal of mutual benefit and double win and improve the operation performance of supply chain at the same time.

关 键 词：资金约束供应链 收益共享契约 银行直接贷款 保兑仓 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] O225[经济管理—国民经济]