机构投资者、终极股东控制与现金持有价值的关系研究  

Research on the Relation of Institutional Investors,Ultimate Shareholder's Control and the Value of Cash Holdings

作　　者：姜毅[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院 [2]东北财经大学津桥商学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2013年第5期84-91,共8页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"上市公司如何选择并购对价与融资方式--基于嵌套结构的经验研究"(71172120);辽宁社会科学规划基金项目"辽宁省上市公司大股东控制下的现金持有问题研究"(L11DGL021);辽宁省高等教育学会"十二五"高等教育科研课题"高等学校预算管理体系研究"(GHYB110116)

摘　　要：本文以沪深两市2005～2011年的391家上市公司为样本,检验机构投资者持股、终极股东两权分离度及现金持有价值的关系。研究发现,当终极股东为国有企业时,提高两权分离度会显著降低持有现金的价值效应;而提高机构投资者持股比例会显著增加持有现金的价值效应。进一步检验提高机构投资者持股比例是否会抑制终极股东两权分离度对于现金持有价值的侵害。研究发现,当终极股东为国有企业时,提高机构投资者持股比例会抑制两权分离度对于现金持有价值的侵害,增加持有现金的价值效应。This article tested the relation of institution investor shareholding, the ultimate shareholder＇s two rights separation degree and the value of cash holdings, taking 391 companies of Shanghai and shenzhen two securities market from 2005 to 2011 as samples. The study found that when the ultimate shareholder was state - owned enterprise, improving the degree of separation of two rights would significantly reduce the value of cash holdings ; and improving the institutional investor＇s shareholding ratio would increase significantly the value of cash holding. Further more, this article tested if impro- ving institutional investor＇s shareholding ratio would restrain two rights separation degree from damaging to the value of cash holdings. The further study found that when the ultimate shareholder was state - owned enterprise, improving the institutional investor＇s shareholding ratio would reduce the damage of two rights separation degree to the value of cash holdings, and increase cash holdings＇ value effect

关 键 词：终极股东 控制权与现金流权的分离度 机构投资者 现金持有价值 

分 类 号：F275.6[经济管理—企业管理]