股权控制、债务容量与支付方式——来自我国企业并购的证据  

Ownership Control,Debt Capacity and the Choice of Payment——Evidence from China's Mergers and Acquisitions

作　　者：孙世攀[1,2] 赵息[1,2] 李胜楠[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,300072 [2]山东财经大学会计学院,250014

出　　处：《会计研究》2013年第4期52-57,96,共6页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002104);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(11YJA630208)

摘　　要：本文以2008至2011年发生并购的企业为样本,研究了股权控制和债务容量对支付方式的影响。结论表明,高管持股比例越大,企业使用现金支付的比例越高;在大股东持股的中等区间内,股权比例越大,并购企业较多的使用股票支付,在股权分置改革的背景下,借助并购重组的机会,出资人有明显的稀释股权的动机,在很低和很高的区间内,股权比例对支付方式影响不显著;债务容量越大的企业,由于具有更大的举债能力,现金支付的比例更高。本文结论对完善并购支付理论、指导我国企业并购实践和提高并购支付决策的科学化水平都具有重要理论和现实意义。The paper studies the effect of the ownership control and debt capacity on the choice of payment with Mergers and Acquisitions(M&A) which occurred from 2008 to 2011.The findings show that the greater proportion of executive stock ownership,the higher the proportion of using the cash to pay in M&A.We also find that with the greater equity ratio of the largest shareholder control rights,the bidder is more likely to use stock to pay when the largest shareholder has an intermediate level of shareholding ratio,which shows that real investors have a significant dilution motive in the context of the share reform.Finally,the enterprises with greater debt capacity will pay higher proportion of cash.Conclusions of this paper have an important value for the payment theory of M&A and can help enterprises to make right payment decision in M&A transactions.

关 键 词：股权控制 债务容量 支付方式 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]