成本不对称使卡特尔更难维持吗?  

Does the Cost Asymmetry Decrease the Cartel Stability?

作　　者：王继平[1] 李景焕[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学经济学院,300134 [2]天津商业大学理学院

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2013年第1期144-152,F0003,共10页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70973087)

摘　　要：经济学家和政策制定者一般都认为,成本不对称使卡特尔协议变得更难维持。本文旨在分析这种传统观点对于卡特尔产量分配规则的敏感性。基于无限重复古诺双寡头博弈框架,运用Friedman的严酷触发惩罚策略以及平衡诱惑概念,本文证明,成本不对称与卡特尔稳定性的关系取决于卡特尔的产量分配规则:当帕廷金产量分配规则可行时,成本不对称使合谋协议变得更难维持的传统观点成立;但是,当帕廷金规则不可行而改用修正的帕廷金规则时,其结论与传统观点截然相反,即随着成本不对称程度的提高,卡特尔变得更加稳定。The purpose of this paper is to challenge the conventional wisdom that cost asymmetry decreases the stability of cartel agreement. Based on the framework of infinitely repeated duopoly game, using the concepts of grim trigger strategy and balanced temptation, this paper shows that the relationship between the cost asymmetry and the car- tel stability dependents on the output quotas rule of a cartel. When the Patinkin＇s rule is fea- sible, the conventional wisdom holds. However, when the Patinkin＇s rule is infeasible, using the improved Patinkin＇s rule, the result is in stark contrast to conventional wisdom in Industrial Organization： as the degree of cost asymmetry between firms increases, a cartel becomes more stable.

关 键 词：成本不对称 卡特尔稳定性 帕廷金规则 平衡诱惑均衡 

分 类 号：F276.8[经济管理—企业管理]