高管报酬、公司分红与薪酬契约改进  

Executive Compensation,Cash Dividend Policy and Compensation Contracts Design

作　　者：杨宝[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《财经论丛》2013年第3期76-83,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部社科规划基金资助项目(12YJA630181);中南财经政法大学博士科研创新课题(2012B0904)

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论分析上市公司高管报酬对分红的影响机理,进而以2003-2010年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验高管报酬与公司分红的关系。研究发现:高管货币薪酬、高管持股对公司分红具有显著正向影响,并且二者对分红的影响具有"替代效应"。相比于国有企业,这种"报酬-分红"敏感性关系在民营上市公司中更为突出;另外,我国上市公司高管薪酬契约并不能对高管"效率"进行有效识别,高管激励与分红优化,需要从"高管报酬契约设计"这一源头抓起。This paper, based on the agency-theory, investigates the relation between executive compensation and payout policy. Then , by TOBIT regression on data from China A share 2003 -2010 listed firms, this paper concludes that executive wage and shareholding have positive impact on corporate cash dividends. However the influence of executive cash compensa- tion and shareholding indicates a substitution effect on firms＇ dividend policy. Empirical results also show that the sensitivity link between executive compensation and cash dividend tends to become more significant in non-state owned firms than in state owned firms. To some extent, China＇s listed firm＇s compensation contracts did not identify the efficiency of managers. Thus the improvement of executive incentive and payout policy should be based on the design of executive compensation contracts.

关 键 词：高管持股 高管货币薪酬 股利支付率 每股股息 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理]