谈判力量参数内生化的供应商和零售商议价模型的研究  

Bargaining Model between Supplier and Retailer with Exogenous Parameters about Bargaining Powers

作　　者：郑士源[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海201306

出　　处：《兰州学刊》2012年第11期129-134,共6页

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(项目编号:11CGL077);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:10YJC630412);上海市重点学科建设项目资助(项目编号:S30601)

摘　　要：建立了供应商和零售商之间的议价模型,并拓展到双方谈判力量参数内生和双方进行序列议价的情形下,求出了各种情形下的Nash议价解和各方的利润。对各种情形下成交价、成交量和各方利润的比较表明:(1)当供应商甲与其他供应商的生产成本之比与产量无关时,各种谈判背景下的最终成交量均相同,整个供应链的总利润也是无差异的;(2)尽管交易量相同,但双方谈判力量不对等时的交易价格要高于两者谈判力量均等的时候;(3)谈判力量均等与不均等时交易价格的差别与供应商甲供货的可靠程度负相关;(4)序列谈判情况下零售商和供应商的利润都较与单一对手谈判时低。The bargaining models between supplier and retailer with exogenous parameters about their bargaining powers and sequential bargaining are established.The deal prices and profits of supplier and retailer are got based on the bargaining models.The comparison of deal prices,deal volumes and profits of supplier and retailer under different conditions shows that the final deal volumes and profits of the whole supply chain under different conditions are same,while the final deal price is higher in the condition of asymmetric bargaining power between supplier and retailer when the ratio between suppliers＇ production costs is irrelevant to production volume.Further,the difference of final deal prices between the condition of symmetric and asymmetric bargaining power has negative relationship with supplier＇s reliability,and the profits of supplier and retailer are both lower in the condition of sequential bargaining.

关 键 词：Nash议价模型 谈判力量不对等 参数内生 序列议价 

分 类 号：F064.1[经济管理—政治经济学]