多任务道德风险下应用服务外包激励机制研究  

Research on the incentive mechanism for multi-task moral hazard in application service outsourcing

作　　者：唐国锋[1] 但斌[1] 宋寒[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第5期1175-1184,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70871128);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0884)

摘　　要：应用服务提供商(ASP)的服务绩效由其硬件条件及软件水平所决定.针对如何平衡激励应用服务提供商在硬件及软件建设的多任务投入问题,以客户企业期望收入最大化为目标,应用委托-代理理论设计了应用服务外包正式契约和关系契约,并分析了贴现率与成本替代强度对契约激励效果的影响.研究表明,贴现率较低时,客户企业应选择正式契约对应用服务提供商进行激励;随着贴现率的增加,关系契约的激励效果增加;关系契约中,不同任务之间的激励效果具有互补性,且随成本替代强度逐渐增强.The service performance achieved by ASP （application service provider） is mainly determined by the conditions of hardware and software. Focused on how to balance the incentive between the two kinds of tasks, the formal contract and relational contract are established based on the principle-agent theory, and then the impacts of discount rate and cost alternative degree to the contract are analyzed. The conclusions imply that the formal contract should be chosen by the customer enterprise when the discount rate is lower; and the incentive effect of relational contract will increase with the discount rate; the incentive effect among different tasks under relational contract are complementary, and will increase with the cost alternative degree.

关 键 词：ASP(应用服务提供商) 多任务道德风险 正式契约 关系契约 机制设计 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]