真理之争——胡塞尔与弗雷格论“真”  

The Debates in the Theory of Truth

作　　者：高松[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2013年第5期73-81,128,共9页Philosophical Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"弗雷格与胡塞尔意义理论比较研究"(编号11YJC720013)的阶段性成果;同济大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

摘　　要：一、命题论与符合论 海德格尔在《存在与时间》中把传统的真理观描述为：“1．真的‘处所’是命题（判断）。2．真的本质在于判断同它的对象相‘符合’。3．亚里士多德这位逻辑学之父既将真归于作为其源始处所的判断，又率先把真定义为‘符合＇”。（海德格尔，第247页）其中的第一句话在最宽泛的意义上表明传统观点认为真理具有综合的、述谓的形式。为方便起见，本文中将这一论题称为“真之命题论”。这一观点确实能在逻辑学之父亚里士多德的文本中找到多处支撑。After the respective reformulations of Frege and Husserl,there arose some tension between Propositional view of Truth(PT) and Correspondence view of Truth(CT),both of which are supposed to inherent in the traditional theory of Truth.Insisting on the PT,Frege maintains that proposition is the original locus of truth and a nominal truth makes no sense at all;on the other hand,from the CT,Husserl believes that the nominal truth is more fundamental than that of proposition to the extent that the latter should be based on the former.The paper attempts to trace the debates between Fregean PT and Husserlian CT to the underlying conflict between Being in the sense of copular and Being in the sense of existence,in virtue of which the deeper meanings of the aforementioned two views will be brought out.Ultimately,a possibility of reconciliation between them will be developed in the context of genealogy of logic.

关 键 词：真理观 “真” 弗雷格 胡塞尔 《存在与时间》 亚里士多德 海德格尔 传统观点 

分 类 号：B023.3[哲学宗教—哲学理论]