公平偏好下纳入股权激励的双重委托代理模型研究  

Study on Double Principal-agent Model Considering Equity Incentive Based on Fairness Preference Theory

作　　者：黄健柏[1] 徐珊[1] 刘笃池[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第5期124-129,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20090162110069);湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目(11YBB378);中南大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2012zzts002)

摘　　要：借鉴F-S模型,将公平偏好理论融入到纳入股权激励的双重委托代理理论框架中,通过概率化模型的参与约束条件进行分析,为研究控股股东的利益侵害问题提供一个新的视角。结果表明:在双重委托代理分析框架中,股权激励的引入使得经理人同时具备所有者和经营者双重身份,能有效地激励经理人。并且,经理人的公平偏好感会使这种激励效果更加显著,一个具有较高公平偏好感的经理人愿意接受的股权比例也相对较高。在以股权相对集中或高度集中为主要特征的上市公司中,给公平偏好的经理人授予适度的股权激励,使其与中小股东保持一致的利益关系,在一定程度上能起到抑制控股股东掏空的作用。This paper uses the F - S model as reference, and takes the fairness preference theory into the analysis framework of double principle - agent which considering equity incentive, it analyses by probity the participation constraints, it finds that the incentives by stock options to the managers may be even more significant under the fairness preference. And the managers expect higher proportion of stock options. In the listed companies which equity＇ s main feature is relatively concentrated or highly concentrated, giving a certain degree of equity incentive to the managers with fairness preference,can make the man-agers＇ interests be consistent with the small shareholders＇ interests. It can restrain the tunneling of large shareholders to a certain degree.

关 键 词：双重委托代理 股权激励 公平偏好 控股股东掏空 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]