征信系统、中小企业融资与博弈论初探  

A Preliminary Study of the Credit Reference System,SME Financing and Game Theory

作　　者：吴丰光[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行沈阳分行,辽宁沈阳110000

出　　处：《吉林金融研究》2013年第3期29-31,共3页Journal of Jilin Financial Research

摘　　要：导致中小企业融资难问题的最直接原因不是信息不对称、融资担保制度缺失以及信贷管理模式滞后等外部因素,而是中小企业自身的失信行为。征信系统通过信用约束机制,改变银企博弈收益矩阵,从而使中小企业在收益最大化条件下自觉守信,从根本上解决中小企业融资难问题。The direct factor that hinders SME financing is not information asymmetry, the deficiency of financing guarantee or the defect of credit management mode, but the default of SME. By setting up a credit constraining mechanism, the credit reference systems changes the payoff matrix of the game between bank and SME, thereby makes the SME to pay back the bank loans within a revenue maximization context and thus solve the problem thoroughly.

关 键 词：征信系统中小企业博弈论 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理] F832.4[经济管理—国民经济]